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We are a nation that has a government—not the other way
around. And this makes us special among the nations of the
Earth. Our government has no power except that granted it
by the people. It is time to check and reverse the growth of
government, which shows signs of having grown beyond the
consent of the governed. It is my intention to curb the size
and influence of the Federal establishment and to demand
recognition of the distinction between the powers granted to
the Federal Government and those reserved to the States or
to the people. 2

INTRODUCTION
A. Statement of Purpose
This paper will argue that beginning with President Reagan
the adoption of unitary theory as a central tenet in presidential
administrations created a now ongoing consolidation of executive
regulatory authority. This consolidation of power has considerably
accelerated over the course of the last four decades. As Courts
continue to defer to the executive in decisions made within the broad
grants of power delegated by Congress, the relevance of the
legislative body dwindles. The checks on executive assumption of
power have largely been removed. The wall between the executive
and the administrative have crumbled, and what were once
considered unofficially separate branches are merging. This
convergence of both the power to enforce and create the laws has no
other outcome but to create significant questions of power allocation
and constitutionality in immigration law and beyond. This idea will
be explored through the historical evolution of United States

2

Ronald Reagan, Inaugural Address, The American Presidency Project,
3/11/2019, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/246336.

3|Page

immigration law, the executive’s expansions of power, and the
gradual rise of the modern American administrative state.
B. Brief Discussion of Modern Expansions of Presidential
Power
When first elected, President Reagan minced no words
regarding his intent during the first of his inaugural speeches in
January of 1980. He intended to reduce the scope of the federal
government and remit powers he saw as usurped by it to the states.
This position could be described as reactionary and a culmination of
the events of the previous three decades. The Presidency had been
aggressively expanding its powers since President Truman sought
to contain Communism in the Korean peninsula. 3 Truman, though,
pushed the boundaries of presidential authority enough to have the
Supreme Court draw a line still applicable to evaluations of
presidential authority today.4 President Kennedy further
consolidated foreign policy decisions in the presidency with
unilateral decisions on major events of the early 1960’s, including
the Bay of Pigs invasion and Cuban Missile Crisis. 5 President
Johnson continued to consolidate foreign policy into the hands of
the presidency, but he also looked inward with his “Great Society”
programs.6 President Johnson had sought, and largely succeeded, in
legislating this expansion of civil rights and government services
3

See, e.g. Louis Fisher, Lost Constitutional Moorings: Recovering the War
Power, 81 Indiana Law Journal 1199 (2006).
4
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
5
See, e.g. David Luban, On the Commander in Chief Power, 81 Southern
California Law Review 477, 538 (2008)
John F. Kennedy, he reports, cut the National Security Council and
Joint Chiefs out of the advising loop, preferring to confer only with his
“inner club.” Kennedy blamed the Bay of Pigs fiasco on bad advice
from the Joint Chiefs; and, after their advice on the Cuban missile crisis
proved inferior to Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara's strategy,
McNamara increasingly came to believe that he and his systems
analysts could plan a war better than the military.
6
See, e.g., Peter Feuerherd, How Great Was the Great Society?, JSTOR,
January 4, 2017, last accessed 03/07/2019, https://daily.jstor.org/how-great-wasthe-great-society/
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from the White House.7 All of these presidents pursued unpopular
wars which were entered into and expanded on the back of a
Congressional resolution instead of a Congressional declaration of
war.8
With Nixon’s resignation, the revolt against the expansion
of presidential power began in earnest. The Supreme Court denied
President Nixon Executive Privilege in forcing him to hand over the
Watergate tapes.9 This was a major rebuke of unlimited Presidential
powers and Nixon’s “Imperialist Presidency.10” In addition,
Congress bristled at the thought of a Presidency left unchecked and
enacted legislation, such as the War Powers Act and National
Emergency Act, meant to curb Executive power through
Congressional oversight.11 Presidents Ford and Carter fought
7

See, e.g. Bruce Miroff, Presidential Leverage over Social Movements: the
Johnson White House and Civil Rights, 43 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 2 (1981).
8
See, e.g., Unchecked Presidential Wars, 148 University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 1637, 1656 (2000) Explaining that every military engagement since
World War II had been authorized by presidential action, not by a Congressional
declaration of war; Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, The Commander-in-Chief,
and the Separation of Powers After Hamdan, 16 Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems 933, University of Iowa College of Law (2007)
Discussing the history of presidential authorization through the George W. Bush
administration and the effect of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 667 (2006) on
executive authorization authority.
9
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974)
However, neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for
confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can
sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from
judicial process under all circumstances.
10
See, e.g. Thomas E. Cronin, A Resurgent Congress and the Imperial
Presidency, 95 Political Science Quarterly 209, 209(1980).
The “imperial presidency” meant many things to many people. But it
especially suggested the abuse and misuses of presidential powers. By
1973 it became an accepted term to describe presidential deceptions,
lying, and transgressions against cherished notions of separation of
powers. A deep-seated skepticism set in as an increasing number of
Americans lost confidence in President Nixon.
11
See, e.g., David S. Friedman, Waging War Against Checks and Balance—The
Claim of an Unlimited Presidential War Power, 57 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW
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contractions of Presidential authority throughout their terms.12 With
the election of President Reagan, a new approach to consolidation
of power in the Presidency arose. For President Reagan to
unilaterally reduce the size of government, he had to simultaneously
assert his power over all administrative offices created through the
power of the executive. The Reagan administration justified this
through the idea that the power of administrative agencies created
under the banner of the Presidency sprang from the power of the
Executive alone.13 In claiming this, President Reagan could issue
directives to those agencies directing how they operated.14 This was
President Reagan’s implementation of the unitary theory of the
presidency.15
This places the discussion firmly on the path to the
Presidency of Donald Trump and the continued efforts by his
predecessors to consolidate power into the hands of the Executive.
Since the resignation of President Nixon and the contraction of
Presidential powers under Presidents Ford & Carter, Presidential
powers have been steadily expanding.16 As the first President to
214 (1983); L. Elaine Halchin, National Emergency Powers, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, Last Accessed 03/07/2019,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/98-505.pdf
12
See, e.g. Phillip Shabecoff, Presidency is Found Weaker Under Ford, THE
NEW YORK T IMES, March 26, 1976; Ann Mari May, Fiscal Policy, Monetary
Policy, and the Carter Presidency, 23 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 699
(1993).
13
See, e.g. Morton Rosenberg, Congress’s Prerogative Over Agencies and
Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration’s
Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 627
(1989).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
See, e.g. Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory
Rivals: An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 227 (2016); Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving
Separation of Powers, 115 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 515 (2015); Jon D.
Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 1023
(2013).
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make unitary theory a centerpiece of their administrative
philosophy, President Reagan resumed what Nixon had been forced
to stop via Watergate and his resignation.17 Over the next four
decades, Presidents would continuously usurp Congressional power
to control and shape policy.18
The longstanding deference of Congressional and Executive
control of immigration policy are starting to be supplanted by issues
concerning separation of powers.19 As the Presidency assumes ever
increasing authority over the federal bureaucracy—what many had
termed the “fourth branch of government”—the checks and balances
envisioned by the founders have been rendered ineffective.20 This is
particularly true in today’s hyper-partisan political climate. In
immigration law, these issues were most recently exposed as Trump
v. Hawaii made its way through the judicial process where it was
ultimately decided by the Supreme Court. 21 The decision itself
should not have been surprising to students of history.
To understand why the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump
v. Hawaii should have been unsurprising to informed observers, it
17

See, e.g., Michael Fix & George C. Eads, The Prospects for Regulatory
Reform: The Legacy of Reagan’s First Term, 2 YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION,
293 (1985).
18
See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARVARD LAW
REVIEW, 2245 (2001) Illustrating the consolidation of administrative authority
through the Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton presidencies; William P.
Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and Why
It Matters, 88 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 505 (2008) Providing a brief
overview of the history of presidential power expansion.
19
For additional reading on court deference in the immigration sphere, see, e.g.,
Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, THE UNIVERSITY
OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW, vol. 74, 1671 (2007).
20
See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation
of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578 (1984)
(describing agencies as the fourth branch of government).
21
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2409 (2018). “Moreover, plaintiffs' request
for a searching inquiry into the persuasiveness of the President's justifications is
inconsistent with the broad statutory text and the deference traditionally
accorded the President in this sphere.”
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is necessary to examine the Supreme Court decisions that initially
asserted federal control over immigration vis-a-vis the states. Only
then does it become practical to examine how that control gradually
flowed
into
the
office
of
the
Executive.

IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY
A. Federalism and the Beginnings of Congressional Control
Outside of Article 1, Section 8 the Constitution was silent on
immigration.22 Immigration policy was largely left unregulated for
the first hundred years of American existence. That changed when
the Supreme Court issued one of its first major immigration ruling
in 1875.23 The Passenger Cases of 1849 would provide the vehicle
for that decision and laid important groundwork for the Supreme
Court to justify federal regulation of immigration policy. The
Passenger Cases were a series of consolidated cases arising from an
import tax disguised as an immigrant quarantine fund. These cases
would be the first to establish Congressional authority over
immigration policy while substantially limiting the state’s ability to
regulate. In order to do so the Taney court looked to the Commerce
Clause. After much discussion of the Commerce Clause’s history
and the dangers of allowing the states to regulate foreign commerce
individually, the court concluded that “the Constitution has
conferred on Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the States.24 25” The state law “must oppose
what has been actually done or prescribed by Congress, and in a case
22

Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the power to make
laws regarding naturalization. The document makes no mention of immigration
otherwise.
23
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 277 (1875). This case would establish the
federal government’s right, and only the federal government’s right, to exclude.
The only exception was an interest of vital necessity to the state and the means
to which the interest was protected were only wide enough to achieve it.
24
Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 562 (1849).
25
Id.
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where it has no reserved power to act differently from Congress. 26”
The Court goes on to cite the decision in Ogden v. Gibbons 27
But in regulating commerce with foreign nations, the power of
Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several
States. It would be a very useless power if it could not pass those
lines. The commerce of the United States with foreign nations is
that of the whole United States. Every district has a right to
participate in it. “The deep streams which penetrate our country
in every direction pass through the interior of almost every State
in the Union, and furnish the means for exercising this right. If
Congress has the power to regulate it, that power must be
exercised wherever the subject exists. If it exists within the
States, if a foreign voyage may commence or terminate at a port
within a State, then the power of Congress may be exercised
within a State.28”
From here, the majority reasoned that the power of regulating
foreign commerce had been undertaken by Congress, stating
Congress had created “treaties, and ha[d] regulated [the United
States’] intercourse with foreign nations by prescribing [those
treaties’] conditions.29” The Court would also address arguments
made that the quarantine of undesirable immigrants was an exercise
of the police powers granted to the state. The Court disagreed,
describing the taxes imposed by the state as a “transit duty.30” The
Court strikes down the state’s ability to “pervert[] into weapons of
26

Id.
In Ogden, the state of New York had tried to grant a single company
monopoly over steamboat navigation in state waters. The Supreme Court ruled
that the establishment of such monopolies interfered with Congressional power
to regulate interstate & foreign commerce. Established the maxim that states
could not interfere with Congressional authority to regulate commerce via
legislative enactment.
28
The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 462 (1849) quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. 1, 74 (1824).
29
Supra, Note 23 at 462.
30
Id at 463.
27
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offence and aggression upon the rights of others” state police powers
which should be reserved for “self-defence and protection against
harm”.31 Finally, the Court addresses the argument that states had
ultimate authority to act upon any person within their jurisdiction,
regardless of their status as a citizen of that state. The Court
dispatches this argument by pointing to the decision in Gibbons
reasoning that a state may attempt to “exclude all vessels but her
own from entering her ports, and may grant monopolies of the
navigation of her bays and rivers. This the State of New York at one
time attempted, but was restrained by the decision of this court”.32
The Court would strike down these types of duty impositions
made by the states but would leave the door open to exercise state
police power “for the preservation of the health, the morals, or the
domestic peace of the States”.33 Later decisions would look to close
that door completely.
B. Eliminating State’s Police Power Immigration Authority
The Supreme Court would revisit this issue nearly three decades
later in its 1875 decision in Chy Lung v. Freeman. In Chy Lung,
California had enacted a statute allowing the state Commissioner of
Immigration to inspect passengers seeking to immigrate into the
United States via California ports prior to anyone disembarking
from the ship. The commissioner was enabled to charge fees based
on snap judgments made in his own discretion. California argued
that the law was meant to exercise its police power to protect the
state from acquiring the burden of care for
[the] lunatic, [the] idiot, [the] deaf, dumb, blind, crippled, or
infirm, [who] is not accompanied by relatives who are able and
willing to support him, or is likely to become a public charge, or
has been a pauper in any other country, or is from sickness or
disease (existing either at the time of sailing from the port of
31

Id.
Id.
33
Id at 464.
32
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departure or at the time of his arrival in the State) a public
charge, or likely soon to become so, or is a convicted criminal,
or a lewd or debauched woman.34
The Supreme Court disagreed, viewing the law as too wide in scope,
and stated
We are not called upon by this statute to decide for or against
the right of a State, in the absence of legislation by Congress, to
protect herself by necessary and proper laws against paupers and
convicted criminals from abroad; nor to lay down the definite
limit of such right, if it exist. Such a right can only arise from a
vital necessity for its exercise, and cannot be carried beyond the
scope of that necessity. When a State statute, limited to
provisions necessary and appropriate to that object alone, shall,
in a proper controversy, come before us, it will be time enough
to decide that question. The statute of California goes so far
beyond what is necessary, or even appropriate, for this purpose,
as to be wholly without any sound definition of the right under
which it is supposed to be justified. Its manifest purpose, as we
have already said, is, not to obtain indemnity, but money.35
The Supreme Court avoided ruling directly on the scope of a state’s
ability to defensively use its police powers but did indicate its
willingness to do so in a later case. Regarding the right of the states
to regulate immigration through its police power, the Supreme Court
states, “Such a right can only arise from a vital necessity for its
exercise, and cannot be carried beyond the scope of that
necessity.36” They continue by asserting their willingness to define
the boundaries of that scope in the next sentence, ” When a State
statute, limited to provisions necessary and appropriate to that object
alone, shall, in a proper controversy, come before us, it will be time
enough to decide that question.37” Throughout the decision the
34

Supra, Note 22 at 277.
Id at 280.
36
Id.
37
Id.
35
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Court is hesitant to grant that the state’s right to regulate
immigration through police power exists at all. In terms of the
California Statute, they strike it down stating the statute, “invades
the right of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
is therefore void.38” With this sentence, the Supreme Court
expressed its opinion that immigration authority was governed by
the Commerce Clause and it was questionable whether states had
any right to regulate immigration at all.
New York would again attempt to justify an import duty on
immigrants by amending the statute struck down in the Passenger
Cases to reflect an inspection law. In People of State of New York v.
Compagnie Générale Transatlantique the Court rejected that people
were property and could be imported. The Court stated
We know of nothing which can be exported from one
country or imported into another that is not in some sense
property-property in regard to which some one is owner, and
is either the importer or the exporter. This cannot apply to a
free man. Of him it is never said he imports himself or his
wife or his children.39
While the Court took time to explain why New York could not
justify taxation of immigrants based on an inspection theory, the
argument had become moot during the appeal process. Congress had
fully asserted their power over immigration under the Commerce
Clause in August of 1882 with the passage of ‘An act to regulate
immigration.’ This act decreed “a duty of 50 cents is to be collected
for every passenger not a citizen of the United States who shall come
to any port within the United States by steam or sail vessel from a
foreign country”.40 The state’s ability to levy any type of import

38

Id.
People of State of New York v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 107
U.S. 59, 62 (1883)
40
Id at 63.
39

12 | P a g e

charge against an immigrant arriving in a port which fell under their
jurisdiction was effectively dead.
C. Constitutional Challenges to the Act to Regulate
Immigration of 1882
Constitutional challenges would come quickly after the
Congressional regulation of immigration duties began. These
challenges would be consolidated in what would become known as
the Head-Money Cases. The constitutional argument for these cases
was presented as follows
[A]ssuming that congress, in the enactment of this law, is
exercising the taxing power conferred by the first clause of
section 8, art. 1, Const., and can derive no aid in support of its
action from any other grant of power in that instrument,
[petitioner] argues that all the restraints and qualifications found
there in regard to any form of taxation are limitations upon the
exercise of the power in this case. The clause is in the following
language: The congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide
for the common defense and the general welfare of the United
States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States. 41
The petitioners argue that the duty imposed on immigrants entering
the country was not established for the defense or general welfare of
the United States and it does not affect the states evenly, and
therefore is not uniform. The Court responds by arguing differences
in revenues raised or distributed do not determine whether a statute
has been uniformly applied. The Court defines uniformity as the law
appl[ying] to all ports alike, and evidently giv[ing] no
preference to one over another, but is uniform in its
operation in all ports of the United States… [p]erfect

41

Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884) (Internal quotes & citations
omitted)
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uniformity and perfect equality of taxation, in all the aspects
in which the human mind can view it, is a baseless dream.42
Additional arguments were levied against the act under the auspices
of violating treaties between sovereign nations. The Court argues
that a treaty is on equal footing with a statute created by the federal
government. They are both regarded as a “law of the land.43” Vis a
vis one another, since a treaty only takes the Senate and Executive
to and statutory authority is derived from both houses of Congress
and the Executive and superiority “would seem to be in favor of an
act in which all three of the bodies participate.44” The Court would
rule that “nothing in the statute by which it has here exercised that
power forbidden by any other part of the constitution.45” In effect,
Congressional authority to regulate immigration had been firmly
established by the Supreme Court.
D. Immigration Act of 1891 & Its Constitutional Challenges
The Immigration Act of 1891 “establishe[d] the office of
superintendent of immigration46” and placed it under the control of
the Department of the Treasury.47 In Nishimura Eiku v. United
States, the Court considered whether Congress had the power to
appoint inferior officers in departments of the Executive. Petitioner
in Nishimura asserted that the inspector of immigration was illegally
appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury. Petitioner argued that
the Superintendent of Immigration should have made the
appointment of the inspector. The Court rejected this argument
stating “the constitution does not allow congress to vest the
appointment of inferior officers elsewhere than in the president
alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. 48”
42

Id at 595.
Id at 598.
44
Id at 599.
45
Id at 600.
46
Nishimura Ekiu v. U.S., 142 U.S. 651, 662 (1892)
47
See § 7, Immigration Act of 1891.
48
Supra, Nishimura at 663. (Internal quotations omitted).
43
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Nishimura also established the idea that the judiciary could not
overrule decisions rightfully made by the legislative and executive
branches or their rightfully designated actors in regards to
immigration on due process grounds. The Court states,
It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that
foreigners who have never been naturalized, nor acquired any
domicile or residence within the United States, nor even been
admitted into the country pursuant to law, shall be permitted to
enter, in opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of
the legislative and executive branches of the national
government. As to such persons, the decisions of executive or
administrative officers, acting within powers expressly
conferred by congress, are due process of law.49
This decision marked the beginnings of the Executive branch’s
influence over immigration policy. It furthered the idea that the
federal government was able to bar who it wanted so long as they
were doing so under the legitimate authority of Congressional
action. Additionally, those actors Congress had vested decisionmaking authority within issued final verdicts that were not
appealable to the judiciary.
[T]he final determination of those facts may be in trusted by
congress to executive officers; and in such a case, as in all
others, in which a statute gives a discretionary power to an
officer, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of
certain facts, he is made the sole and exclusive judge of the
existence of those facts, and no other tribunal, unless
expressly authorized by law to do so, is at liberty to reexamine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on
which he acted.50

49
50

Id at 660.
Id.
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The proper offices to make those decisions fell “either to the
department of state, having the general management of foreign
relations, or to the department of the treasury, charged with the
enforcement of the laws regulating foreign commerce.51” The
President, as the Chief Executive, names the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Secretary of State—both departments formed
under executive authority.52 As unitary theory became a more
prominent idea, executive control of all subordinate offices of the
Executive and their employees/appointees would lead to the
President having great latitude in shaping immigration policy
through Executive directive.
The Nishimura case helped establish the right of the federal
government to do three things in the field of immigration law, (1)
deny entry to noncitizens, (2) allowed Congress to vest decision
making authority regarding entry in offices other than itself and
outside the legislative branch, and (3) labeled decisions made by
those agents as final decisions excluded from review by the
judiciary. Shortly after this decision, the Court would again weigh
in on the rights of the sovereign in regard to immigration, this time
as it related to the deportation of noncitizens.
In Fong Yue Ting v. U.S. the Supreme Court examined the
right of the federal government to expel noncitizens and whether this
expulsion violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court discusses
the right of the sovereign to choose who may remain in its lands at
length. They ultimately arrive at the following conclusion
The power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power
affecting international relations, is vested in the political
departments of the government, and is to be regulated by
treaty or by act of congress, and to be executed by the
executive authority according to the regulations so
established, except so far the judicial department has been
51
52

Id at 559
See Article II, § 2, Const.
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authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the
paramount law of the constitution, to intervene.53
Here the Court grants Congress, and to a lesser extent the President,
authority to control who may remain in the country. The Court also
defers to the Constitution’s ultimate authority while excluding their
right to become involved unless authorized by statute or treaty
language to do so. Once they conclude that a sovereign does have
the authority to expel noncitizens, the Court expands on Congress’s
power to expel nonresident aliens at its whim stating
Chinese laborers, therefore, like all other aliens residing in
the United States for a shorter or longer time, are entitled, so
long as they are permitted by the government of the United
States to remain in the country, to the safeguards of the
constitution, and to the protection of the laws, in regard to
their rights of person and of property, and to their civil and
criminal responsibility. But they continue to be aliens,
having taken no steps towards becoming citizens, and
incapable of becoming such under the naturalization laws;
and therefore remain subject to the power of congress to
expel them, or to order them to be removed and deported
from the country, whenever, in its judgment, their removal
is necessary or expedient for the public interest.54
In this part of the ruling the Court granted ultimate authority over
immigration to Congress. They provide Congress the vehicle by
which to expel and admit nonresidents. This combined with the
authority to regulate naturalization laws as delegated under the
Constitution gave Congress control over all the major processes
involved in immigration.55 The last major hurdle to Congressional
dominion over immigration would be brought under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
53

Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893)
Id at 724.
55
See Art. I, Sec. 8, Const.
54
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The Court had largely laid the foundation of its reasoning on
the question of Due Process violations in earlier decisions. The
Court revisited this reasoning again near the beginning of Fong Yue
Ting, foreshadowing their ultimate decision. The Court ruled
immigration status and its adjudication did not constitute a trial and
sentencing for, but merely an ascertainment of, an alien’s right to
remain in country. The Court avoided a Due Process conflict by
defining immigration outside the bounds of a normal judicial
proceeding. Deportation was not a punishment per se, only a way
for the sovereign to enforce “the return to his own country of an
alien who has not complied with the conditions upon the
performance of which the government of the nation, acting within
its constitutional authority, and through the proper departments, has
determined that his continuing to reside here shall depend.56” As a
political question, the Court declined to express an opinion upon
“the wisdom, the policy, or the justice of the measures enacted by
[C]ongress in the exercise of the powers confided to it by the
[C]onstitution”.57
By the end of the nineteenth century, Congressional power
to control policies regarding immigration had been firmly
established. The Executive’s role was also somewhat defined as
Congress could delegate responsibilities in enforcement to certain
executive departments, specifically the state & treasury
departments’ head. The judiciary gave substantial deference to the
interplay between Congress’s delegation of authority to executive
agencies and how those agencies chose to wield it.
The Court subjected these delegations of power to what
amounted to a rational basis review, a relatively low hurdle to
clear.58 The Court would also categorically abstain from weighing
56
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in on implications of policy decisions, labelling such matters
political questions.59 This would come to be known as the plenary
power doctrine. This scenario would set the stage for continued
expansion of Presidential authority and influence in the sphere of
immigration policy and enforcement. Having a judiciary reticent to
rule on policy matters that was willing to allow Congress to delegate
its authority to another branch would lead to an opportunity for
executive usurpation of immigration control. While the bureaucracy
created by executive agencies had historically been viewed as an
unspoken fourth branch of government operating autonomously, the
advancement of the unitary theory of the executive would see its
autonomy weakened and then fully usurped by presidential control.
As the executive and the administrative wings of the federal
government became exceedingly beholden to the person holding
executive office, the Congressional and Executive offices were
placed squarely on a collision course with the Constitution and its
own delegation of authority.
E. The Shifting Sands of Federal Authority
Prior to 1875’s Chy Lung decision, regulation of immigration
was largely done on the local and state level. Chy Lung moved
authority into the hands of Congress as a function of foreign
commerce regulation. At the turn of the twentieth century, the
judiciary was in the process of moving federal justification of
immigration control from a theory of foreign commerce regulation
to a theory of national sovereignty. The Immigration Act of 1891
and the Court’s opinion in Fong Yue Ting cemented the sovereign
theory of immigration as the Court’s new view. More importantly,
though, the Court circumvented due process considerations by

of this power is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry, into which a Court
will not enter unnecessarily.”
59
The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889). This case established
the “plenary power” doctrine and highlighted an approach of deference to the
legislative and executive branches in immigration matters. The court ruled that
those decisions were “conclusive upon the judiciary.”
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placing foreign nationals outside the purview of Constitutional
protections and all but the barest of judicial consideration.
The Court’s reticence to intervene remains relevant throughout
this discussion and will likely need to be discarded in order to avoid
Constitutional crisis. Pearson v. Williams 60 shows the Court’s
hesitation to overrule both Congressional and executive agency
decision making authority at the turn of the twentieth century.
Congress had entirely removed the subject of immigration from the
purview of the courts, and the courts repeatedly endorsed Congress’
ability to do so.61 If Congress, the Constitution, or a foreign treaty
did not demand judicial review of an agency action, those decisions
were final upon appeal to the treasury secretary and subject to only
an abuse of discretion review by the court. This is a plain error
standard and quite a high bar given the deference courts give to
agency decision making.62
Congress would pass several immigration acts over the course
of the next fifty years. The first of those acts was aimed at restricting
the inflow of immigrants from Asian countries and introduced a
60

Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281 (1906). Court holds that it is without doubt
that Congress has the authority to expel noncitizens. The Court examines
whether the commissioner of immigration can hold a second deportation hearing
after adjudication in favor of the nonresident in the first. They rule that as a
function of the executive and not the judicial power, immigration hearings do
not fall under the idea res judicata. As such, it is permissible for immigrants to
be placed under scrutiny a second time.
61
Fok Young Yo v. U.S, 185 U.S. 296, (1902). (“By the act of August 18, 1894
(28 Stat. at L. 390, chap. 301), the decision of the proper executive officer, if
adverse to an allen's admission, was made final unless reversed on appeal to the
Secretary of the Treasury”); See Also Lee Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S.
538 (1895).
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Fok Young Yo v. U.S., 185 U.S. 296. “we think that, upon the admitted facts,
the orders of the collector cannot be held to have been invalid”; See Also
Tulsidas v. Insular Collector of Customs, 262, 266 U.S. 258 (1923)
It was for them to establish their exemption from the prohibition of the
law; for them to satisfy the insular officials charged with the
administration of the law. If they left their exemption in doubt and
dispute, they cannot complain of a decision against it.
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reading requirement to enter the country.63 The Immigration Act of
1917 greatly expanded the types of immigrants excluded from
immigration, discussion of which is beyond the scope of this
argument. 64 The important takeaway is that the courts continued to
defer to the executive administrative agency’s decision-making
without offering anything other than abuse of discretion review.
There were several cases the Court did take up after the act became
law. These mostly had to do with defining who would qualify as a
white person under section 2169 of the Immigration Act of 1917.65
Being a free white person had become requisite after the passage of
the act to become naturalized as a United States citizen. 66 In
addition to race, this act also imposed a literacy test on new
immigrants, increased the taxes paid by new immigrants, and
defined an entire region, known as the Asiatic Barred Zone,
ineligible to immigrate to the United States.67 Again, the courts
would avoid ruling on the merits of such policy and only interpret
the intent of Congress when judging who met the legislative criteria
Following a long line of decisions of the lower Federal
courts, we held that the words imported a racial and not an
individual test and were meant to indicate only persons of
what is popularly known as the Caucasian race. But, as there
pointed out, the conclusion that the phrase ‘white persons'
and the word ‘Caucasian’ are synonymous does not end the
matter. It enabled us to dispose of the problem as it was there
presented, since the applicant for citizenship clearly fell
outside the zone of debatable ground on the negative side;
but the decision still left the question to be dealt with, in
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See Immigration Act of 1917, Sec. 2
http://library.uwb.edu/Static/USimmigration/39%20stat%20874.pdf Sec. 2
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See, e.g., United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 43 S.Ct. 338 (1923); Ozawa v.
United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
66
Immigration Act of 1917, Section 2.
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Immigration Act of 1917 Sec. 2-4.
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doubtful and different cases, by the process of judicial
inclusion and exclusion.68
The process of judicial inclusion and exclusion, or who does and
does not meet the definition of a statute, continued the tradition of
judicial deference on questions of immigration policy.
Congress would amend the 1917 act in 1924 creating nationbased limitations on the number of immigrants able to enter the
United States each year.69 While a quota system had been in place
for over three years, this act would further reduce the number of
immigrant visas available.70 Additionally, Congress would retool
the formula on which immigration quotas were set.71 This change
gave preference to immigrants from the British Isles and Western
Europe while reducing the number available for Eastern and
Southern Europeans.72 Unsurprisingly, Congress also barred
completely those that would not be able to naturalize. This included
the majority of Asia.73
The Court would break no new ground while the Immigration
Act of 1924 remained good law. They remained an assessor of
applicability, deferring to the powers of Congress to create law and
those tasked through the office of the executive to enforce it. The
majority of cases for this time period, though, revolved less around
the immigrants than in times past. These cases largely ruled on
applicability of fines to those ships carrying immigrants into the
country that did not have authorization to enter.74 The Act itself had
68

U.S. v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 208 (1923) (Internal quotations
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Immigration Act of 1924 (The Reed-Johnson Act), Office of the Historian,
Last Accessed 03/07/2019, https://history.state.gov/milestones/19211936/immigration-act
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See, e.g., U.S. v. Cosulich Line, 76.F2d 128 (2nd Cir. 1935); International
Mercantile Marine Co. v. Elting, 67 F.2d 886 (2nd Circuit 1933).
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supplied straightforward restrictions on entry and was difficult to
challenge on discriminatory grounds.75 For example, citizens that
had married abroad after the act’s passage were unable to bring their
spouse into the country if they were a banned nationality.76 Even if
they were half white.77 Immigrants were barred from reentry even if
they had lived in the United States for nearly fifteen years.78
Each of these examples share the fact that the courts only sought
to define the law’s application, and not what the law was. The
United States would operate under the framework of the
Immigration Act of 1924 for nearly thirty years. The Second World
War would force American legislators to reexamine their stance on
immigration as labor shortages during the war and the need to
provide relief to decimated European villages and populations after
the war put pressure on the United States to ease its immigration
requirements.
F. World War II & The Need For Change
As World War II took much of the United States’ workforce
to Europe and the Pacific, the country was left scrambling to find a
source of replacement labor that could meet the substantial need of
American farms and industry. Starting in 1942, the United States
government entered into an agreement with Mexico to solve the
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See Immigration Act of 1924. For example, nation quotas were created based
on a percentage of immigrants coming from those countries in 1890. Most of
Asia was barred from entry either through the “Asiatic Barred Zone” of the Act
or earlier Chinese Exclusion legislation. If you were barred or immigrated from
a country whose quota had exhausted you would not be allowed into the
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See Haff v. Tom Tang Shee, 63 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1933).
77
See Bonham v. Bouiss, 161 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1947).
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U.S. ex rel. Polymeris v. Trudell,284 U.S. 279 (1932). Holding that there is no
right to enter the United States unless that right has been granted by the United
States. In not being able to produce a return permit or immigration visa due to
leaving prior to the effective date of the act, Plaintiffs were unable to show they
had secured that right and were deported back to Greece.
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labor issues caused by the war.79 Known as Braceros, hundreds of
thousands of these agricultural workers entered the United States
through 1964 when the United States completely overhauled its
immigration policies.80 While a continuing need for labor was one
of the motivating factors for reevaluating United States immigration
policy in the early 1950’s, the affect of World War II on Europe and
the Far East was likely a larger impetus for change. 81 Legislation
passed in the in the 1940’s had such an intent and that was carried
forward in the Congressional intent of the 1952 act. As
Representative Joseph Farrington stated during floor debate while
discussing the lifting of nationality restrictions as contained in the
INA of 1952
[T[he enactment of this law will bring great change in the
attitude of those people…[the act’s] passage is vitally
important from the standpoint of our future in the Pacific
because it will remove what has always been a serious source
of irritation in our relationship…[t]he value of such a step is
indisputable.
In 1943…to get the support of the Chinese in the fight
against the totalitarian powers, the House repealed the racial
restrictions in our immigration and naturalization
law…followed in 1946 by similar action in regard to the
Filipinos and the people of India.
It provides in addition the solution of several difficult
problems. One of these has been created by the marriage
of…American citizens serving in the Armed Forces in the
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Overview of INS History, USCIS HISTORY OFFICE AND LIBRARY, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, 9, last accessed 3/11/2019,
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Pacific and Far East to girls of races now ineligible for
citizenship.82
It is also important to note that within the same debate,
Representatives of the House comment on the dangers of granting
the executive the power to halt immigration. This provision was
included in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. Its
inclusion gave some Representatives pause. Emmanuel Celler, a
Representative from New York, comments that, “[t]he President has
that right in times of peace, in times of war, in times of emergency,
and in time of nonemergency, to shut off immigration…we should
very carefully scrutinize that provision”.83 Upon another
Representative pointing out that the provision requires immigration
to be “detrimental” to the United States, Representative Celler
responds, “But what is meant by ‘detrimental’ is left entirely to the
judgment, or shall I say the possible imagination of the chief
executive officer”.84, 85
The Immigration and Nationalization Act of 1952 would be
voted, adopted, and signed into law toward the end of the year. It
contained the provision to grant the President authority to halt
immigration when it is detrimental to the interests of the United
States. It also maintained the National Origins quota system began
in the 1920’s, though over the objection of many members of
Congress. Congressman Peter Rodino from New Jersey closed his
comments on the House floor by stating “immigration is so basic to
our welfare…international relations and…growth and development
of the country that we must make every effort to place the national
need above personal prejudices in considering this legislation.86
Perhaps the most important result of the 1952 act was the
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codification of the nation’s immigration laws in a single section of
the United States Code.87
G. Immigration in The Era of Civil Rights
As Representative Rodino alluded, Congress would need to
return to the immigration policy debate only thirteen years later.
New questions arose due mainly to the perception of racial bias
within the immigration system. The National Origins Formula had
been used to derive immigration quotas since the passage of the
Emergency Quota Act of 1921.88 This would be addressed in 1965
through amendments to the 1952 act introduced by Emanuel
Celler.89 These amendments would do several important things for
immigration law. First, they abolished the National Origins Formula
in favor of a numerical cap for all immigrants. They also provided
for seven classifications to prioritize entry while allowing
immediate family members of United States citizens and special
immigrants to avoid being subject to cap restrictions. These
amendments had the de facto effect of limiting immigration from
the western hemisphere for the first time, as immigrants from Latin
America were subject to a cap on immigrant entry for the first time.
90
Additionally, the amendments would consolidate more power
over immigration in the executive branch. The Department of Labor
would be required to certify a labor shortage in order for visas to be
granted to noncitizens looking for labor in the United States. This
was required whether the labor was skilled or unskilled.91
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Despite the changes to the 1952 version of the act,
challenges still came before the courts. Often these actions involved
plaintiffs requesting the courts overrule the administrative orders
issued in their cases. In a continuation of previous policy, the courts
would refuse. The plenary powers granted to the executive agencies
regarding their immigration decisions were absolute and not subject
to judicial review. The courts would reaffirm this idea in several
cases of the era stating
It has long been held that the Congress has plenary power to
make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those
who possess those characteristics which Congress has
forbidden.92 [O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative
power of Congress more complete than it is over’ the
admission of aliens.93 [I]t is important to underscore the
limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration
legislation.94”
The Supreme Court’s continued refusal to interject itself into the
discussion of Congress’s power to regulate immigration has become
a major factor in the executive’s ability to direct policy through the
exercising of administrative control. While issues were slow to build
in the first hundred years of immigration control, the Berlin Wall
would not be the only barrier of note Ronald Reagan would have a
hand in bringing down.95 The breakdown of the wall between the
administrative wing of government and the chief executive has
significantly increased the control the chief executive has over
immigration policy over the last forty years.
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H. Immigration Act Of 1990 and Policy Toward the Present
Immigration would continue to be a point of discussion and
policy over the next twenty-five years.96 The Vietnam War created
its own unique considerations dealing with immigrants & refugees
from Southeast Asia.97 The Haitian “Freedom Flotilla” or Mariel
boatlift of 1980 would combine with the ongoing issues of
undocumented immigration across the Southern border to compel
Congressional action on naturalization and immigration in 1986.98
It would ultimately be the economy’s need for skilled workers that
would drive amendments to immigration policy in 1990.99
As President George H.W. Bush stated during his speech before
signing the bill, "Immigration isn't just a link to America's past, it's
also a bridge to America's future. This bill provides for vital
increases for entry on the basis of skills, infusing the ranks of our
scientists and engineers and educators with new blood, and new
ideas.100" The Immigration and Nationality Ac of 1990 would create
several new employment-based nonimmigrant visa categories while
nearly tripling the number of those visas available.101 The act also
revised the admission preferences by splitting them into three
different categories: family-sponsored, employment-based, and
diversity immigrants determined by a lottery. The family-sponsored
96
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and employment-based immigrants were each assigned 4
subcategories that were subsequently ranked in preference for their
corresponding visas.102
More importantly, Congress granted the executive the ability to
grant temporary, protected, or deferred enforced departure status to
any group of immigrants that met certain criteria. These
designations allowed those that received it certain benefits, such as
work authorization and protection from deportation.103 In doing so,
this act ceded more Congressional authority to make immigration
decisions to the executive branch.
While there have been other legislative actions aimed at
immigration since 1990, the examples provided sufficiently
illustrate the court system’s reticence to interject itself in
immigration policy decisions and the allocation of authority by
Congressional action to executive actors. Having established these
practices, the idea that unitary theory has accelerated an inevitable
collision between the Constitution and the executive as chief
administrator may be explored.
THE RISE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
A. The Supreme Court Hands Control to the Executive
The scope of managing a country which stretched from the
Atlantic to the Pacific coasts and covered an area of nearly four
million square miles could not have its laws effectively enforced by
the office of the executive as a singular entity. Since the Presidency
of George Washington, it has been customary for the executive to
select advisors as members of his cabinet.104 These advisors would
serve as the secretary in charge of their department.105 Washington
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began this tradition by naming four members to his cabinet.106
Executive agencies have been considerably expanded since the
country’s founding and are comprised of at least fifteen major
departments with several smaller additional agencies.107 There are
also legislative agencies, which are created by Congress, that the
executive may have some control over.108 While it is important to
know they exist to avoid confusion, they are not particularly relevant
to the present discussion. The major distinction between the
executive and legislative agencies is that the executive agency
secretaries serve at the pleasure of the executive as the Supreme
Court ruled in 1926.109 The 1935 case Humphrey’s Executor v.
United States put a limit on the executive’s ability to remove the
heads of agencies, and allowed for Congress to prescribe the
circumstances under which the heads may be dismissed.110 The
Court summarizes the executive’s power of dismissal thusly
“To the extent that, between the decision in the Myers Case,
which sustains the unrestricted power of the President to remove
purely executive officers, and our present decision that such power
does not extend to an office such as that here involved, there shall
See George Washington’s Mount Vernon, Cabinet Members, last accessed
3/11/2019, https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digitalencyclopedia/article/cabinet-members/
107
See United States Government Organizational Chart, last accessed
3/11/2019,
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O4rJRM/nhIRwSw==&SF=VHhnJrOeEAnGaa/rtk/JOg==&AspxAutoDetectCo
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108
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[W]e have no hesitation in holding that conclusion to be correct; and it
therefore follows that the Tenure of Office Act of 1867, in so far as it
attempted to prevent the President from removing executive officers
who had been appointed by him by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, was invalid, and that subsequent legislation of the same
effect was equally so.
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remain a field of doubt, we leave such cases as may fall within it for
future consideration and determination as they may arise.”111
As discussed above, the earliest immigration policies were
enforced by the Secretary of the Treasury. 112 Congress gave the
executive branch wide latitude to create rules and policies within the
scope of the power they granted.113 Congress also allowed for the
creation of an administrative judiciary, which adjudicated decisions
based on administrative policy.114 The federal judiciary’s decision
not to interject itself into this process effectively gave administrative
policy the power of law.115 As a matter of course, the administrative
arm of the executive branch would serve as its own legislator,
enforcer, and adjudicator.116 Once Congress ceded authority to the
executive via legislation, it became very difficult to reclaim. Any
legislation attempting to limit the executive’s power would need to
be signed into law by the executive. This creates a significant
conflict of interest.117
Congress attempted to assert itself as a check against unfettered
executive policy making authority. For several decades, Congress
inserted legislative vetoes into proposals passing through both
houses. These vetoes allowed Congress to overrule administrative
decision making without executive oversight.118 Incidentally, a
challenge to one of these vetoes would be brought under the 1952
Immigration and Naturalization Act decades after its passing.
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INS v. Chadha would be granted certiorari by the Supreme Court
and a decision would be issued in 1983. Congress had inserted a
legislative veto within the 1952 act. Upon the suspension of the
respondent’s deportation order, Congress sought to exercise its
authority to review based on the language of the legislative veto
provision.119 Respondent was ordered deported after a single house
of Congress voted to lift the suspension of his deportation.
Respondent sued questioning the constitutionality of the legislative
veto provision and argued that the decision to lift the suspension of
his deportation amounted to a legislative action. As a legislative
action it would constitutionally require passage by a majority of both
houses and presented to the executive.120 The Burger Court agreed
with Respondent. The Court found the legislative veto provision in
the language of the Immigration and Nationality Act
unconstitutional. The Court did not relegate their decision simply to
the case before them. Instead, it issued a broad ruling striking down
Congress’s ability to invoke legislative veto provisions as
unconstitutional.121 This ruling would have a profound effect on
Congressional ability to check executive agency decision-making.
A great number of the legislative actions ceding power to the
executive branch had included veto provisions since the 1930’s.
These provisions had been a major Congressional check on
unfettered executive administrative authority.122
The judiciary would also continue its practice of deferring to the
decisions of the administrative bodies acting under the authority of
Congress. In Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
the Court would set a standard of review in questions of
administrative decision validity.123 This 1984 case developed a twopart test for judicial intervention in administrative decision-making.
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The first prong evaluated whether Congress had granted the
authority to decide in direct language. If this test was met, no further
investigation was warranted. The courts would defer. If not, the
second prong would evaluate whether the decision fell under the
authority granted by Congress. If it did, the courts would defer to
the administrative body’s reasonable interpretation of
Congressional language.124 This is essentially the intelligible
principle standard created by the 1928 decision in J.W. Hampton v.
United States.125 The Chevron test, as it became known, established
very narrow grounds on which the courts would intercede.
Particularly, if the decisions made by an administrative body
exceeded the scope of authority granted by Congress. 126
Chadha in conjunction with Chevron significantly weakened
Congressional ability to retake authority it had previously delegated.
Under this new standard, the executive had to be willing to
relinquish authority already granted. The Presentment Clause along
with Bicameralism would make clawing back delegated authority a
very steep hill to climb. Additionally, legislation granting the
authority was often created in broad terms to give the administrative
wing of the executive branch wide latitude to perform their assigned
124
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duties. There were often few statutory checks on the actions the
executive could take. The Court could have been a major obstacle
for the executive, but the Chevron decision established there were
very limited circumstances in which the courts would frustrate
administrative decision-making. By 1986, the executive appeared to
be in control of the federal bureaucracy and there appeared to be
little recourse the other branches could or would take to wrest away
control.
While Congress has passed legislation to force administrative
authorities to report actions directly to Congress, Congressional
influence was otherwise limited. 127 The Administrative Procedure
Act was passed in 1946 to standardize the way in which
administrative regulations were created and give more transparency
to the process.128 The public notice and comment requirements
located in § 553 and the adjudication limitations located in § 554 of
the Administrative Procedure Act serve to put restraints on the
actions administrative agencies may effectuate, but still provide
little recourse for Congressional influence.129
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Additionally, section 554 defines the rights of a party facing adjudication by an
administrative court. Provides for such rights as notice of time and place of a
hearing and the right to present a defense and evidence to support it.
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With Congress having few remaining options to check the
authority of executive branch administrative rule-making and the
courts granting wide deference for agencies to act within the bounds
of their statutorily granted authority, the executive office could
potentially assert itself over that process and guide policy decisions
that carry the force of law. While previous executives had done so
to a limited extent, President Ronald Reagan’s adamant assertion
that administrative agencies were governed by the Unitary Theory
of the Executive would aggressively seek to consolidate power into
the chief executive’s hands.130
B. The Unitary Theory of the Executive
Ronald Reagan was not the first president to invoke inherent
authority over agencies under the banner of the executive. There are
examples throughout the history of the presidency o chief executives
justifying their actions by claiming authority over the agencies
operating under the executive wing of government. 131 The
difference with President Reagan was that he asserted unitary theory
as a central piece of his presidential power and sought to exercise it
to direct governmental policy from the White House. Reagan
attempted to do so significantly more often than any other modern
executive before him.132
Current Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito was Deputy
Assistant Attorney General in the Reagan administration. During his
confirmation hearing to become a member of the nation’s highest
court, he was asked about unitary theory by the late Senator Ted
Kennedy. Justice Alito’s response is a clear and succinct summary
of the administration’s justification of the idea that all power of the
executive flows first through the President.
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I think it’s important to draw a distinction between two very
different ideas. One is the scope of Executive power . . .. [W]e
might think of that as how big is this table, the extent of the
Executive power. [W]hen you have a power that is within the
prerogative of the Executive, who controls [it]? [T]he concept of
[the] unitary Executive doesn’t have to do with the scope of
Executive power…It has to do with who within the Executive
branch controls the exercise of Executive power, and the theory
is the Constitution says the Executive power is conferred on the
President.133
The central idea of the unitary theory is that the exercise of executive
authority must first be authorized by the President based upon the
constitutional delegation of powers. It follows, then, that in order for
an agency under the banner of the executive to act, it must do so
only once it has authorization to do so.
Arguments against this theory include the President’s duty to
faithfully execute federal law. It is true that the executive branch
may not enforce a law in a way which directly contradicts the
statutory language.134 Additionally, the Written Opinions Clause
suggests that the executive may seek the opinions of his department
heads in order to make an informed decision.135 When these two
clauses are read together, they would seem to suggest that the
Framers anticipated that the executive would be making decisions
in regard to enforcement of laws absent an explicit directive from
the legislative branch.136 Absent an explicit directive the executive
would be free to execute the laws—and direct agencies operating
133
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under his authority—as he or she may so choose within the bounds
prescribed by legislative authority.
C. The Unitary Executive and the Convergence of the
Administrative Branch and the Presidency.
The Constitution’s framers were wary of any branch of
government having unchecked power, particularly Congress.137 The
framer’s split Congress into two houses in order to strike
compromise between states wanting population based
representation and states wanting equal representation, but also to
bifurcate Congressional power and provide the legislature an
internal check against itself.138 The framers were most concerned
that Congress would grow too powerful and consume the other
branches.139 Perhaps in weakening Congressional authority by
strictly outlining the powers granted, the framers may have left too
much uncertainty in the authority delegated to the Executive. As
demonstrated above, those powers relating to immigration have
been checked by the courts even less frequently—whether
undertaken by Congressional or Executive actors.
The Framer’s assumption that a strong Congress would check
the executive’s power, the Constitution’s silence on immigration
authority outside of naturalization, and the court’s policy of
deference on immigration policy questions has created a perfect
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See, e.g., James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers
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storm of sorts for present day practice.140, 141, 142 In Chadha, the
Supreme Court struck down longstanding Congressional checks on
the powers delegated to the executive known as legislative vetoes.
This decision revoked Congressional authority to execute any
meaningful unilateral action to overrule post-delegation decisions
made by the Executive.143 Congress had been placing these vetoes
in legislation since the 1930’s. They served as a Congressional
check on Executive overreach. Once they were ruled unenforceable,
though, consequences only marginally considered when making
such delegations were unleashed. Prior to Chadha, Congress relied
on the legislative veto as their main source of unilateral control over
the powers they delegated to the Executive. Faced with the vetoes’
unenforceability, Congress was now tasked with the proposition of
creating legislation granting Congressional oversight and then either
convince the Executive to sign that legislation or muster enough
support to overcome its veto. Congress no longer had a recourse
where it was the sole actor.144
Future Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer defined the
problems created by the historical unraveling of these events during
a 1990 panel on Agency Autonomy and the Unitary Executive.145 In
discussing the test used to justify Congressional power delegations
to administrative agencies, Breyer reaffirms that the courts have
140
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historically been unwilling to strike down legislation delegating
authority to the executive provided
1) the power is at least arguably related to the basic function of
that branch;146 2) the specific text of the Constitution does not
specifically forbid the delegation;147 and 3) the delegation of the
power to one branch does not unreasonably interfere with the
ability of a different branch to carry out its constitutionally
mandated duties.148, 149
A year prior to this panel, the Supreme Court ruled on issues
regarding delegation of powers to the other branches in United
States v. Mistretta.150 Mistretta involved a challenge to
Congressional delegation of power to the executive for determining
mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines. In cases involving
delegation of power, the Court developed a test for gauging the
constitutionality of such legislation. This test is referenced above as
the intelligible principle doctrine. J.W. Hampton Jr. & Company v.
United States developed this doctrine and allowed for circumvention
of the nondelegation doctrine so long as Congress "lay down by
legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to [act] is directed to conform."151, 152 It is important to
note that a delegation of authority has not been struck down since
1935 under the nondelegation doctrine and the principle of
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nondelegation has long been considered dormant.153, 154 There have
been repeated opportunities for the Supreme Court to revive the
doctrine as lower federal courts have ruled against the
constitutionality of a Congressional delegation by invoking the
nondelegation doctrine, but the Supreme Court has consistently
overruled attempts to breathe life back into the standard.155
Thus far this note has established four irrefutable truths in the
present relationship among the three branches of government.: 1)
Congress has ultimate authority over immigration; 2) Congress may
delegate their authority to executive agencies; 3) the Court is
reluctant to interject itself into immigration policy or check
Congressional power to delegate their rule-making authority; and 4)
Congress may not attempt to circumvent bicameralism or the
Presentment Clause in attempts to retake its already delegated
authority. These four points of fact established the criteria needed
for a strong-willed executive to steer policy making in areas under
executive agency control. In 1980, Ronald Reagan would defeat
Jimmy Carter in a landslide victory. Reagan had run on a platform
of a reduction in government interference. In a climate of high
unemployment and double-digit inflation Regan asserted, “In this
present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem;
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government is the problem.156” After his election, Reagan would
look to unitary theory to justify his unilateral actions attempting to
reduce the size of the federal bureaucracy.
D. Reagan Sets the Standard
At the outset of this note, several instances of policy directives
were given starting with President Truman.157 While it is true that
President Reagan was not the first to utilize the executive’s authority
over the executive branch’s sub-agencies to drive rule making and
enforcement choices parallel to their own agenda, he was the first to
assert his absolute authority to do so.
In 1974, President Ford initially tasked the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) with considering the financial
implications of regulatory measures. While placing aspects of
regulatory financial review under an executively controlled agency,
this requirement did not insert the Executive into the decisionmaking process.158 President Carter would expand on this in
1978.159 In addition to requiring financial evaluation prior to
adoption, Carter’s 1978 order required a secondary evaluation after
implementation, which became known as retrospective regulatory
review.160 Again, retroactively assessing whether a policy had met
its goals was not attempting to create executive authorization for
administrative rules, but Carter’s executive order set the precedent
for Reagan to further involve the OMB in regulatory decisions161
156
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In 1981, President Reagan would assign the OMB additional
responsibilities, causing it to serve as a clearinghouse for regulatory
rule creation.162 This order was the most successful and long-lasting
of Reagan’s unilateral policy initiatives to reduce the size and
spending of the federal government. Reagan’s redefining of the
responsibilities of the OMB and its sub-agency the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) placed the executive as
the de facto decision-maker on regulatory policy. Both these offices
fell directly under presidential control as members of the Executive
Office of the President. 163 As part of the order, Reagan tasked the
OIRA with finding wasteful regulations and eliminating them. In
addition, proposed regulations were required to be both in line with
the executive agenda and cost-effective for the OIRA to grant
approval for adoption.164 In 1984, Reagan would issue his second
Executive Order aimed at executive administrative review.165
Reagan sought to create a master regulatory plan, compiled by the
OIRA , which required agencies to submit any anticipated
regulatory actions for the upcoming year.166 At the time, Reagan’s
assertion of his control over the unnamed fourth branch of
government was viewed as a radical departure from historical
practice. Such choices would place Ronald Reagan among those
presidents that sought to substantially expand the powers of the
presidency, or “the Imperial Presidents.”167
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Through executive order, President Reagan bestowed his office
with the ability to centrally review regulatory proposals made by
executive agencies and force those proposals to be in line with the
goals and policies of the current administration.168 Additionally,
while the ultimate rule making authority likely remained in the
hands of the agencies, the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs has actually reported great success in convincing agencies to
adopt their favored regulations.
While Reagan largely failed to reduce the size of the federal
government, his policies did slow its expansion—while turning the
country into a debtor nation.169 Reagan’s attempts to reign in the
federal government through executive order and control of the
federal bureaucracy’s rule-making apparatus opened a Pandora’s
box of sorts. While it was expected that George H.W. Bush,
Reagan’s vice president, would continue down a similar path, what
surprised many was the continued expansion of these practices
under subsequent Democratic executives.
E. Expansion After Reagan
Bill Clinton defeated George H.W. Bush in the Presidential
election of 1992. President Clinton would address the administrative
rule-making process in September of 1993 with his own Executive
Order.170 Surprisingly, President Clinton would revise and expand
the orders issued by President Reagan.171 The first order would
further define how agencies should expect to establish their
regulatory prerogatives. Early in the year’s planning cycle, federal
agencies, aside from independent agencies, were to meet with the
168
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Vice President to establish regulatory priority. All regulations—
whether the agency was independent or not—under development or
review were to be compiled and submitted to OIRA and include
basic information. Additionally, all agencies were expected to
prepare a plan of the most significant regulatory actions expected to
be issued in either proposed or final form in the present year.172
President Clinton also sought to make sure all executive
agencies were moving toward the same goals. Clinton tasked the
OIRA with ensuring that proposed and preexisting significant
regulations were within the bounds of the law, the President’s
priorities, and did not conflict with other agencies’ proposed
rules.173 Proposed rules could not be published in the Federal
Register until the OIRA had made sure they met these criteria, and
agencies had to reconsider any rule returned to them by the OIRA.174
Clinton would issue another order directed toward agency
rulemaking near the end of his presidency. This order was geared
toward eliminating regulations that would preempt state law or
circumvent other principles of federalism.175 Agencies would be
required to consider regulations based on the principles of
federalism laid out within the order.176 Agencies were to avoid
making national policy unless Congress expressly allowed for
national preemption authority or that Congress alluded that was their
intent.177 The language of Clinton’s second order was largely
borrowed from a similar order on federalism issued toward the end
of Reagan’s second term, though it did insert additional language
enabling preemption.178
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President Clinton began his Presidency by expanding on
Reagan’s attempts to assert executive control over the rule-making
process. Clinton inserted the Vice President into the conversation
while making sure the OIRA had the authority to reject proposed
rules and force agencies to revise them. Despite Clinton’s second
order appearing to limit the scope of agency rule making, in reality
it was expanded. The previous order issued by Reagan remained in
effect. President Clinton incorporated a significant amount of that
order’s language, but also inserted the ability for agencies to issue
orders that could affect principles of federalism, something not
previously available.179 Clinton left office having granted more
authority to the executive to control regulatory action.
George W. Bush would win the Presidency in 2000 and a year
after taking office would issue his first order regarding regulatory
action.180 President Bush sought to consolidate executive control
over regulatory direction even more extensively than Clinton had in
1993. Instead of placing the Vice President into the discussion, Bush
sought to have the executive’s Chief of Staff or director of the OMB
mandatorily present.181 Each of these positions fell directly under
the authority of the President and would thus be able to influence
the process in line with the executive agenda more reliably. The
Chief of Staff and director of the OMB would always have the threat
of being replaced hanging over them. This was something the Vice
President would not have had to consider.
In 2007, George W. Bush would once again address regulatory
review through the executive office. Curtis Copeland, a researcher
for the Congressional Research Service, referred to the changes
made under this executive order as “the most significant changes to
the presidential regulatory review process since 1993.”182 Several
179
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requirements were added to the regulatory review process at the
issuance of this order.
First, all proposed rules had to state an explicit market failure
which created the regulations need.183 While agencies could identify
potential causes that created a need for a regulation previously,
identifying an actual market failure established a higher bar for
regulatory adoption.184
The order also required agencies to provide a cost-benefit
analysis for their regulatory plan in its totality. While Executive
Order 12866 created the requirement that agencies submit a costbenefit analysis for individual regulations, this expanded those
requirements significantly and represented a much larger
undertaking than analyzing a few proposed regulations.185
Additionally, the order placed a presidentially appointed
regulatory policy officer that had to approve an agency’s agenda of
regulatory action. While rules specifically authorized through the
agency head were outside this requirement, this represented a
significant increase in the executive’s influence over policy
adoption.186
The order also required the OIRA to review any agency
guidance documents with significant economic impact.187 This
complemented the OIRA’s responsibility to review economically
significant regulations.

183

Supra, Note 180.
Compare Supra, Note 180, with Supra, Note 162.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
184

46 | P a g e

Finally, the last major piece of the order required agencies, in
conjunction with the OIRA, to pursue the formal rulemaking process
for the resolution of complex determinations.188
While these new requirements significantly tightened the
executive’s grip over the administrative role of that branch, it would
be short lived. Barack Obama would repeal both of George W.
Bush’s orders within the first year of his presidency, returning the
language to that of Executive Order 12866. Additionally, this
executive order directed all agencies to discard all policies and
practices developed to implement those directives created by
Executive Order 13422.189
President Obama would issue two additional orders relating to
executive regulatory review. The first would create the policy of
retrospective regulatory review.190 This was largely an attempt to
reduce costs and eliminate redundant or obsolete policy from agency
regulations. It required agencies to periodically review regulations
and determine those that could be eliminated.191 Additionally,
agencies had to be able to make a reasonable determination that the
results would justify the cost of implementation before adoption. In
this cost-benefit analysis, the agencies were directed to consider
hard to quantify ideas such as human dignity and fairness.192 The
order encouraged integrative and innovative approaches to problem
solving while stressing flexibility and the objectivity of scientific or
technological information used to make support regulatory action.193
Finally, the order established a floor of 60 days for public comment
period, stressed how important public participation was in the rule-
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making process, and required agencies to make commenting as well
as proposed rules and their backing materials available online.194
President Obama’s final order regarding regulatory review
would come in 2012. This order expanded on Executive Order
13563’s retrospective review requirements. It expanded on the
administration’s idea of the process of retrospective review in
greater detail. 195 This included how agencies should interpret
policy, include the public in the review process, prioritize policies
needing review, and keep agencies accountability by requiring
retrospective review reports be submitted to the OIRA twice a
year.196
Before discussing the Trump administration, it is important to
note the ongoing cycle over the last forty years and five presidents;
since President Reagan first asserted the idea that the executive had
singular authority over all executive agencies. Republicans have
tended to significantly expand the power of the executive to control
rule-making. Democrats have sought to reverse those policies that
consolidated rule-making authority in the hands of the executive to
the largest degree, but then issued their own order expanding
executive control in a more limited way. This cycle has born out
each time control of the executive has changed parties since 1980.
Practically speaking, this means that executive control has been
continuously expanding and never regressing below the control
President Reagan initially asserted in his first order.
The Trump administration, in less than two years, issued more
Executive Orders relating to executive regulatory review than all of
his predecessors combined.197 Some of these were concerned with
dismantling the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) as the Trump
194
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administration fought to have it repealed.198 One of President
Trump’s first actions upon taking office was to sign an order
requiring agencies to grant waivers, deferrals, and exemptions to the
maximum extent of their ability under law.199 This requirement was
established in very broad terms, requiring the governing agency to
provide for exemptions, deferrals, or waivers any time a policy
regarding the ACA created a financial burden. The actual language
guided agencies to act when the ACA imposed a “fiscal burden on
any State or a cost, fee, tax, penalty, or regulatory burden on
individuals, families, healthcare providers, health insurers, patients,
recipients of healthcare services, purchasers of health insurance, or
makers of medical devices, products, or medications.”200
President Trump’s second order would require the elimination
of two existing regulations for any new regulatory actions to be
considered.201 It also required the cost of the discontinued
regulations to offset the cost of any regulations adopted.202 This
order was targeted toward economically significant rules, and
required non-compliant agencies to submit a yearly report outlining
their plan to become compliant.203 All guidance on implementation
of this policy was to come directly from the OMB.204
In his third order, President Trump would look to create policy
regarding the United States financial system.205 Though not directly
naming it, this order would specifically address regulations created
as required by the Dodd-Frank Act.206 It created principles by which
the Treasury Department could revise existing rules and ensure
198
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policy was in line with administration goals.207 Additionally, there
was a reporting requirement requiring the secretary of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury, in consultation with the heads Financial
Stability Oversight Council, to provide regular updates to the
president on "the extent to which existing laws, treaties, regulations,
guidance, reporting and recordkeeping requirements, and other
Government policies promote the Core Principles and what actions
have been taken, and are currently being taken, to promote and
support the Core Principles."208
The administration’s fourth order would create additional
positions within agencies. This new position of Regulatory Reform
Officer was tasked with ensuring Executive Order 13771 was
implemented, agencies were conducting cost-benefit analyses in
accordance with Executive Order 12866, effectively reviewing
enacted policies through the retrospective review requirements of
Executive Order of 13563, and eliminate programs and activities
derived from rescinded policy.209 The order would also create
Regulatory Reform Task Forces, which were concerned with
identifying regulations that should be eliminated.210 This essentially
created a mechanism to enforce the requirements of order 13771.
Executive Order 13781 would continue to attempt to dismantle
the executive agency regulatory framework. It tasked the OMB with
developing a comprehensive plan to reorganize the executive branch
agencies.211 The order provided guidance on how to approach such
a proposal and provided for public comment.212

207

Supra, Note 205.
Id.
209
E.O 13777, February 24, 2017.
210
Id
211
E.O. 13781, March 13, 2017.
212
Id.
208

50 | P a g e

Subsequent orders carried on in much the same vein. Executive
Orders relating to environmental regulation,213 tax regulation,214
regulations regarding the federal collective bargaining process and
public sector federal unions,215, 216, 217 and the appointment of
administrative law judges.218 The most recent of those orders is
perhaps the most consequential as it gave agency heads the capacity
to appoint judges outside of the merit-based selection process
typical of most civil service positions.219
CONCLUSION
The takeaway from the last forty years of regulatory review
directives is that each, in its own way, has sought to consolidate
decision making authority within the Presidency. It has not mattered
which party was in the White House, if Congress was in opposition
to the sitting President, or if both houses and the Presidency were
controlled by the same party. The Chief Executive has acted
unilaterally to increase his authority over the regulatory framework
with an increasing frequency and scope. A continuation down this
path may have no outcome other than a Constitutional showdown.
The willingness of the Supreme Court to interject itself into
attempted usurpations of regulatory immigration authority must
increase. Since Chadha, the ability of the legislative branch has been
hamstrung, giving legislators few choices other than to maintain an
approach to governing that had become far too important to
abandon. By 1984, the administrative state was far too ingrained into
American society to discard. Even if the legislative branch chose to
pursue an alternative path, the Presentment Clause required
213
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executive acquiescence to a Congressional retaking of authority. A
requirement unlikely to be met.
Historically, the Supreme Court has refused to hear cases
dealing with any issues other than clear error or actions that occur
outside of the authority delegated by Congress in the immigration
realm. Most statutes were written with broad terms which gave
agencies great latitude to act. As the primary administrators and
regulators of federal law, agencies wield great amounts of power.
This power had once existed largely extra-executively. Time has
chipped away at this dichotomy.
The executive and the
administrative are becoming one; their convergence hastened by the
adoption of unitary theory by President Reagan in the early 1980’s.
Exacerbating the issue, Congress currently has little authority
and limited appetite to check the executive’s continued assumption
of regulatory control. The checks relied upon since the 1930’s to
retain control over the authority Congress delegated were deemed
unconstitutional. The delegations remained, however, absent a
control mechanism for Congress. The Chadha decision created the
requirement of an unrealistic outcome to rebalance the scales. The
executive must willingly give away his authority.
It is more likely that the Supreme Court will need to discard the
approach that has placed us here, particularly in regard to
immigration. As an area with no Constitutional guidance, the Court
is only bound by its prior decisions. With the climate presently
surrounding immigration, a great opportunity is afforded the Court
to correct the path the country has been placed upon. Absent such a
change in direction, Congressional relevance will continue to
dwindle. The executive will wield increasingly more legislative
power across an ever-expanding scope of regulatory bodies and
Congress will have little choice but to continue to create them. This
continued syphoning of power has created a collision course
between the executive branch and the Supreme Court. Steps should
be taken to avert a Constitutional showdown by allowing Congress
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to reassert some form of control over those powers delegated to
regulatory bodies.
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